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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 001734

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR/ERA, PRM/AFR; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS  
USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015  
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SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

**¶11. (U)** Summary. The April 20 transatlantic consultations on Africa (COAFA) addressed priorities in the Great Lakes (ensuring democratic governance, supporting security sector reform and fostering regional stability), Somalia (consolidating the peace process), Sudan (Darfur and North-South); West Africa (Liberia, including funding issues); and options for highlighting Africa at the upcoming U.S.-EU Summit. The Luxembourg presidency underscored the broad range of agreement and multilateral cooperation the U.S. and EU share with regard to Africa.

**¶12. (C)** The U.S. delegation asked the EU to consider more aid for the Liberian elections and urgent food aid to Darfur. Both delegations agreed to support the recommendations of the joint assessment mission regarding AU involvement in Sudan, and the expansion of that mission. The EU promised to provide the USG with a list of areas where the EU hopes to cooperate with ECOWAS, and the U.S. agreed to provide EU experts with unclassified documents outlining USG counter-terrorism efforts in Africa. End Summary.

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Participants  
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**¶13. (U)** EU participants included: Alain de Muyser, Director for African Affairs (MFA) and Nadia Ernzer, Senior Advisor for Africa and CIS Affairs (MFA) for the Luxembourg Presidency; Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes; Koen Vervaeke, Head of the EU Council Secretariat Africa Task Force, and desk officers Peter

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Clausen, Jesper Tvevad, Genoveva Hernandez, Christian Manahl and Van Reedt Dortland Ran; Anders Henriksson, Director for the Horn, East and Southern Africa (DG DEV), Elizabeth Pizon, Unit Head for Central Africa (DG DEV), Miriam Brewka, ACP Issues Unit (DG RELEX) for the European Commission (EC); and Tim Hitchens, Head of the Africa Department (Equatorial), Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ruth Bradley-Jones, Permanent Representation, for the incoming UK Presidency. USDEL consisted of Ambassador Michael Ranneberger (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF), Donald Heflin (Deputy Director, AF/Regional and Security Affairs), Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor, USEU/USAID) and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM).

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U.S.-EU Summit  
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**¶14. (C)** Echoing a call by the Belgian Foreign Minister during President Bush's February 22 visit to Brussels, De Muyser said that our cooperative efforts in Africa, particularly as they relate to development assistance and crisis management, should be publicized at the June U.S.-EU Summit. A half hour of brainstorming resulted in a few preliminary ideas to recommend for consideration by summit organizers. One suggestion that gained broad support was to highlight the range of multilateral cooperation the U.S. and EU have jointly undertaken during the year in Africa, along with a few proposed areas for future transatlantic efforts. Examples of what has been accomplished include: strengthening the AU, consolidating the peace in Sudan and Liberia, accelerating the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, sponsoring the tripartite agreements in the Great Lakes and responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Examples of what might be achieved in the coming year: preventing the spread of terrorist activities, promoting good governance in Zimbabwe and developing effective early warning mechanisms in conflictive areas.

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Great Lakes  
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**¶15. (SBU)** The Great Lakes region remains the EU's top priority in Africa. Vervaeke reported that the EU's High Representative Javier Solana and Development Commissioner Louis Michel will visit Kinshasa on April 29 to press forward its agenda. It will be the first time these two senior EU

officials have undertaken a joint mission.

16. (C) Regarding DRC, Ajello expressed concern over the status of the draft constitution. He said the current plan does not contain a sufficient balance of powers to ensure democratic governance. The planned "winner takes all" system could be a catalyst for post-election violence since losers will have no incentive to support the new government. One group likely to be in this category is the RCD Goma, a military force with a powerful ally next door. Ajello recommended the U.S. and EU intervene jointly to assure that sufficient guarantees are incorporated in the new constitution to prevent the creation of another autocratic regime on the continent. He noted that it was unclear at this point whether the president would be elected by the Parliament or by popular vote. Ajello said the international community should not be so focused on holding quick elections that it ignores flaws in the draft constitution.

17. (C) Ajello said that the cost of the elections was estimated at \$430 million, with \$110 million of that for logistics. He said that logistics could be covered by MONUC if there is agreement in New York to expand the mandate. Such an agreement would necessarily include payment for the expansion from assessed contributions. Ranneberger emphasized U.S. support for a credible election process and said the U.S. would provide some limited funding. The proposed UN resolution on election funding has serious implications for the U.S., given that the U.S. obligation is 28 percent. Ajello stressed that without MONUC, the elections cannot happen. Vervaeke said that the EU is not willing to pinpoint a date for elections as too many of the legislative and logistic details need to be resolved. Given the current situation, Vervaeke said the EU fears the elections could slip to the spring of 2006.

18. (C) Another area of concern is the slow pace of the DRC's security sector reform (SSR), as well as the disarmament, demobilization, return and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants. Ranneberger stressed the critical role EU and Belgian support for SSR and DDRR plays in stabilizing the region. He said the continuing presence of armed groups and militias with varying ethnic composition, territory, and objectives is the principal problem in Eastern Congo and pointed out the need also to address the problem of disarming militias in the North and South Kivus. Ajello said that DDRR is not working well enough and that higher-ranking officers are not interested in the "orientation centers" being set up. Vervaeke characterized the SSR as "chaotic" despite the efforts of the Belgians, South Africans and others, but said that it was crucial for the transition. Troika participants indicated that the EU is sending eight EU military advisers to the DRC as an advisory mission to work closely with MONUC. They would also like to link up with the U.S.-sponsored fusion cell.

19. (SBU) Ajello indicated that EU High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Louis Michel would be making an unprecedented joint mission to the DRC to highlight EU support of the Great Lakes process and to press on the need to follow through with security sector reform.

10. (C) The EU is pleased with developments relating to MONUC and feels that AU peacekeepers will not be necessary if an integrated Congolese force can help MONUC ensure stability. Ajello said that in his meeting earlier on April 20 with President Museveni, the Ugandan leader praised the Pakistani and Indian brigades for bringing order to the Ituri region.

11. (C) Vervaeke provided some details about the EU police mission (EUPOL) in Kinshasa to support the political reform process. He said that roughly 30 experts from a variety of EU Member States are assisting with the establishment of an integrated police unit whose mission will be to protect governmental institutions. Having experts on the ground in Kinshasa will also provide needed analysis.

12. (C) Ranneberger gave a readout of President Kagame's recent visit to Washington and said that U.S.-EU cooperation in the region had been highlighted. Kagame welcomed the U.S.-facilitated tripartite talks, whose objective is to develop confidence and coordinated action to reduce the threat posed by armed groups in eastern Congo. Ranneberger also noted the recently-announced FDLR-DRC talks brokered by Sant' Egido are a positive development. He said that the U.S. is calling on the Rwandans, as well as the other parties, to work with the DRC and MONUC to help make the voluntary repatriation of FDLR forces and their families a success. Ranneberger said that although the Rwandans were willing to provide security guarantees, the FDLR would not be welcomed as a political force.

13. (C) All three components of the EU gave a strong endorsement for Ambassador Swing to continue in his current role as special UN envoy. Ajello said that the EU has been approached by the UNSYG for candidates to replace Swing, but

"changing horses in mid-stream, or more precisely, near the end" would be counterproductive. Vervaeke said that having an American in this position was important to keep the U.S. engaged in the Great Lakes.

¶14. (C) Ajello gave a relatively positive assessment of the political situation in Burundi, but cautioned against allowing elections to be postponed. He said that those in power had no incentive to hold elections as they probably would not be returned to government. In the meantime, public services in Burundi are collapsing, no unpopular decisions are being taken, and the communities are stressing their differences instead of their commonalities. Ajello said that the FNL needed to be integrated into the process and highlighted the successful intervention of Tanzania. Both Ajello and Pizon expressed concern about the deteriorating economic situation in Burundi. Pizon urged the U.S. to participate in a technical meeting to be held on May 12 to discuss Burundi's budget situation.

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Liberia/Mano River Basin  
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¶15. (C) Ranneberger noted good cooperation between the U.S. and the EU in West Africa and stated that we were looking forward to DAS Woods' May 11 meetings in Brussels. He said the USG has developed an action plan to press the Liberians on corruption issues and will share it with the EU before May 11. Furthermore, the USG will also share a State/AID/Treasury discussion paper on funding issues with the EU in Washington on April 22. Ranneberger said the U.S. looks forward to seeing the results of the EU audit and hopes to develop a consensus on these issues between the USG, the EU and the IFIs.

¶16. (C) Regarding rehabilitation and reintegration, Ranneberger mentioned the USG's additional contribution of \$15 million to the Trust Fund and thanked the EU for matching funds, while noting that there was still a \$6 million funding gap. Turning to elections, Ranneberger stated that they must take place as scheduled October 11 and asked that the EC consider contributing more than their currently-planned \$1 million in election support.

¶17. (C) Ranneberger concluded by asking the EU what they thought about Charles Taylor. How big a threat is he? What, if anything, should be done about turning him over to the Special Court? De Muyser said that he had been in Liberia last month and thought several main clusters needed to be addressed, including Charles Taylor. The Troika indicated that the EU would likely support actions to intensify pressure on Taylor, including perhaps through a UNSC resolution giving UNMIL arrest authority should Taylor appear in Liberia. Regarding elections, de Muyser agreed that there must be no delays. He also expressed EU concern about accelerating IDP returns and reintegration. On corruption and audits, De Muyser said pressure on Bryant was needed.

¶18. (C) Turning to the Mano River Basin, De Muyser noted that the EU was worried about a Togo-like situation developing in other countries. Hitchens stated that West Africa is seen as an area of problems, but noted that the Sierra Leone PKO is winding up at the end of 2005 and urged that we consider other bright spots in the sub-region. Ranneberger noted that ECOWAS is a bright spot, that he was somewhat encouraged by the efforts of the AU in Cote d'Ivoire, but that the Togo elections may not go well. On Guinea, Ranneberger noted there was some potential for peaceful change centered on a group of young technocrats in the government and the prime minister, but that a key question was where the military stood. He suggested that support for ECOWAS might be cited in the U.S.-EU Summit communique. Ranneberger reviewed USG support to ECOWAS; De Muyser said that the EU was working with ECOWAS on a list of areas where they could cooperate, which they would share with the U.S.

¶19. (C) Vervaeke said that the EU was planning early warning exercises with Guinea-Bissau and Guinea scenarios and suggested that they might share methodologies and approaches with the U.S. He also asked about the next SRSG for Liberia, and Ranneberger replied that names were being vetted.

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Somalia  
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¶20. (C) Henriksson and De Muyser welcomed U.S. re-engagement in Somalia, but urged a more proactive approach. Henriksson noted that the EC had remained in Somalia through the 1990's when other major donors had left and that it had "heavily invested" in the country as the largest donor.

¶21. (C) Hitchens underscored EU belief that a peace-support mission is necessary to consolidate the peace process in Somalia and requested clarification of the U.S. view on IGAD. Ranneberger said that the U.S. opposes the involvement of

frontline states and would only support a mission if the conditions were right. He said that although there were no specific criteria, we are looking at various benchmarks. Most importantly, the transitional government needed to demonstrate relative stability and reach out to various groups within Somalia in order to pave the way for relocation to Mogadishu. Other obstacles to the IGAD plan, Ranneberger noted, included costs and fears of over-extending the AU and regional organizations in peace operations. He asked whether there was unanimity among IGAD members for the operation (suggesting some IGAD countries privately did not support the plan). Ranneberger said that Konaré was lukewarm, at best, to the IGAD plan. Henriksson acknowledged this plan was not a popular idea in Addis. However, he said it was an EU priority, that certain Member States were extremely interested, and that it was the best hope for peace in Somalia.

¶22. (C) Hitchens noted that the EU was clearly more positive on IGAD involvement in Somalia than the U.S. Ranneberger emphasized that the U.S. has consistently supported IGAD efforts to promote Somali reconciliation and wants to see the Transitional Government succeed. To summarize the differences, Hitchens characterized the EU approach as "yes, but..." and the U.S. approach as "no, unless...". He cautioned against U.S. pronouncements that seemed to indicate that absolutely no external forces could be involved, noting that only Islamic extremists in Somalia held those views. While acknowledging that the U.S. statement had put pressure on the Ethiopians to step back, Hitchens suggested that it had also interrupted the internal dialogue. Henriksson said that a way had to be found to keep Ethiopia involved in the process without sending Ethiopian troops into Somalia. Manahl proposed decentralizing the AU involvement by setting up a military planning unit in Nairobi for a support mission. He noted that Somalis were only likely to hand weapons over to external forces in a disarmament initiative.

¶23. (C) Hitchens said Ugandan cooperation with the AU might be a possible formula for a support mission. (Note. Later in the day, Javier Solana met with President Museveni. According to a press release, Museveni "reconfirmed Uganda's intention to provide troops for a peace-support operation in Somalia under the auspices of IGAD. Mr. Solana underlined the EU's readiness to consider support for an African peace-support mission that has the consent of the Transitional Government and Parliament of Somalia and is welcomed by the Somali public." End Note.)

¶24. (C) Regarding the transitional government, Manahl agreed with Ranneberger that imposing it on the Somali people would not work. He also agreed that the split between the President and Parliament needed to be addressed. Hitchens said that if the transitional government stayed much longer in Kenya the peace process would be jeopardized. Henriksson suggested a "two phase rocket" with relocation into Somalia first and then later on to Mogadishu.

¶25. (SBU) Ranneberger proposed that U.S. experts hold a video teleconference with EU experts to review the situation on Somalia with a view to exploring any differences of perspective and ensuring closer coordination. The Troika team agreed. (Note. The teleconference took place on May 12. End Note.)

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Sudan  
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¶26. (C) Ranneberger noted excellent cooperation between the U.S., EU and Member States and said that the U.S. wants to use the opportunity provided by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to leverage positive movement in Darfur. He said the CPA was always seen as applying to the whole country, that it links Taha and Garang in partnership. Since violence in Darfur can destroy the peace process, the CPA and Darfur are interrelated. Ranneberger reviewed the results of the Deputy Secretary's participation at the Oslo donors' conference and visit to Sudan. He said the Deputy Secretary stressed to VP Taha and SPLM Chairman Garang the interrelationship. Furthermore, he urged both to move forward with implementation of the CPA, particularly by completing the constitutional revision process. The Deputy Secretary laid out specific steps that the GOS should take on

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Darfur and urged Garang to be helpful with the Darfur rebels.

¶27. (C) Ranneberger said that he thought that the deadlines could be met to have the Government of National Unity in place by the end of the pre-interim period on July 9. There has been some positive movement on Darfur -- violence has significantly diminished, as a result of pressure by U.S. and EU, and the presence of the AU. Both sides agreed on the need to continue reaching out to get Garang energized and work the AU piece. Ranneberger reported on his recent trip

to Darfur and said that he had visited six or seven AU bases. He came away impressed by the commanders and the sense that the AU is a strong presence, doing an effective job. He said USG supports an expansion of the AU force and is planning to dedicate \$50 to 60 million to this purpose.

¶28. (C) Ranneberger added that the AU-sponsored political talks are important and that NGOs will work with the rebels to prepare them for negotiations. However, he stressed that there are real problems on the humanitarian side. The WFP will be cutting back rations within weeks. Work needs to be done to bring the NDA, the Egyptians, and Eritrea in.

¶29. (U) Lerner gave an update on the Darfur food pipeline and noted the WFP announced it would have to cut back to half-rations in May due to a break in the pipeline. She observed that the USG has given \$234 million in food aid and asked for more robust EU assistance. (Note. On April 21, WFP advised it had received assurances for the EC to proceed with pre-financing against expected CY-2005 contributions in order to avoid having to go to half-rations. End Note.)

¶30. (C) De Muyser said that he thought the Pronk report was pessimistic and that he appreciated the U.S. stance on UNSC 11593. Manahl said that he also thought the AU force was good, should be expanded, and should receive additional EU support. He said the shortcomings of AU organization, as identified in the joint assessment mission report, need to be addressed. According to Manahl, EU military experts believe the efficiency of the mission will be decreased if shortcomings are not addressed. He also emphasized the need to address root causes of the conflict and that tribal reconciliation should be addressed by a third party, preferably the AU. Manahl was less optimistic than the USG that the CPA can provide the framework to address Darfur in practice.

¶31. (C) Henriksson said that he thought the problems of the South are as much from a lack of capacity as from a lack of political will. "Is there a South-South dialogue?" he asked. The oil fields are controlled by non-SPLM forces, there are transparency and governance issues, and the EU is concerned by what they see. Henriksson said he would like to dialogue with USAID. He also asked how the U.S. saw the consequences of the ICC on peace prospects in Darfur and for views on the CPA implementation. How do we see adjusting policy-sharing aspects of the CPA to include Darfur, the East, etc.?

¶32. (C) Ranneberger replied that we agree with the recommendations of the joint assessment mission. He said that in his follow-up visit to Addis he had pushed Konare and Djinnit on implementation, including the establishment of a planning cell in Khartoum. Ranneberger noted that the Secretary signaled strong support for the AU when she met

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with Konare on April 15. In response to EU questions, he reviewed the status of South-South dialogue and steps the U.S. is taking to encourage inclusiveness in the implementation of the CPA.

¶33. (C) Ranneberger noted that the involvement of the ICC does not preclude credible accountability mechanisms by the GOS. The AU could be helpful in this regard. He said the U.S. is also pushing Darfur rebels to stop the violence and to participate in political talks, noting that they are also subject to accountability.

¶34. (C) Ranneberger asked if the EU could announce soon a pledge to support AU expansion. Henriksson replied that the EU has not yet received a request from the AU for additional assistance. The EU would have to make sure that it is an operation they feel confident in. He asked that the U.S. push the AU on implementation of the joint assessment recommendations. Henriksson thought the AU will issue a formal request just after its Peace and Security Council meets at the end of April. EU planners are ready to go to Addis, but it depends on cooperation from the AU. He sees them facing two challenges: stabilizing the security situation and creating conditions for safe and sustainable return of IDPs and refugees.

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African Union  
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¶35. (C) Ranneberger noted that the AU is a very important institution, which the two sides had covered throughout the day. He added that while much of the focus is on the AU's conflict mitigation role, we should not lose sight of NEPAD, peer review, and all other AU programs. Ranneberger said that he was impressed by the EU's assistance figures for the AU. The U.S. is looking at establishing a modest fund for capacity and institution building, in addition to increases in ACOTA and GPOI funding for peacekeeping, training efforts. The PDAS also reported on Chairman Konare's recent successful

visit to Washington.

¶36. (C) De Muyser agreed that the June U.S.-EU summit declaration must mention the AU. The EU had extensive talks with the AU at last week's ministerial. They seek a strategic partnership with Africa, with the AU being their main, but not only, interlocutor. The EU will provide a non-paper to the USG. A Commission official noted the EU's support for the African Peace Facility, saying that the EU has "put their bet" on the AU.

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Counter-Terrorism  
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¶37. (C) Ranneberger reviewed U.S. efforts on counter-terrorism, noting that Africa presents an opportunity to deal decisively with an incipient terrorist threat in some areas while preventing the region from becoming an operating platform for terrorists. He said there is a North African element that affects the Sahel, including GSPC, as well as an East African aspect that affects Somalia and Eastern Kenya. Ranneberger said the U.S. is keeping an eye on Nigeria, as is al-Qaeda. Cooperation across the continent is quite good, a success story, including Sudan. The PDAS outlined the holistic nature of EACTI and TSCTI, and he and Heflin provided some funding numbers.

¶38. (C) Ranneberger also noted that there is a worldwide Muslim outreach effort, with substantial funding. De Muyser said that CT is one of the EU's 2005 priorities, and asked how we can achieve US-EU cooperation in Africa CT. Van Reedt Dordtland said that the EU has only started to cooperate with Africa in terms of counterterrorism with Kenya being their venue for their first initiatives. He saw value in cooperating with the USG. Heflin promised to provide him with unclassified papers on USG CT efforts in Africa.

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Closing and Comment  
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¶39. (C) De Muyser noted that the previous transatlantic consultations on Africa focused on country-specific issues, whereas the April 20 meeting concentrated on broader-based discussion, which he saw as positive. Ranneberger said the discussions had been very constructive, and he emphasized that both sides should follow-up on the action items identified in the talks.

¶40. (C) The emergence of Somalia as an issue of concern for the EU is one we will have to follow closely. Furthermore, the EU's nuances on expanding the AU mission in Darfur need to be closely monitored in order to keep the transatlantic cooperation in the region on track. The EU also seems to have taken a cue from our style of passing the tin cup by encouraging the U.S. to provide more generous funding for elections in the DRC.

(PDAS Ranneberger has cleared this cable.)

Khartoum minimize considered.

MCKINLEY

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